乡镇政府监管下绿色家居企业与消费者行为策略演化博弈分析

[Objective]With the promotion of green development policy and market benefit,green home furnishing has great market development prospect in rural areas.In order to explore the behavioral strategies of all parties in the township green home market in the market evolution,[Method]a tripartite evolutionary game and its dynamic equation of household enterprises,township governments and township consumers were constructed.By analyzing the stability of equilibrium points and Matlab numerical simulation,the influences of the changes of the main parameters on the system evolution results were analyzed.[Results]The higher the value of various taxes collected by the township government,the lower the probability of green home furnishing enterprises.The more subsidies given by the government to household furnishing enterprises,the more subsidies implemented to township consumers with the increase of township government input cost,the probability trend of this behavior will gradually decrease.The higher the price of green household products,the trend of purchasing behavior of township consumers gradually decreases.[Conclusion]The results show that the taxes and other fees charged by township governments to household enterprises must be higher than the total costs of supervision and input and subsidies,so as to ensure sustainable development in an evolving and stable market environment.Too much enterprise and consumption subsidies will not be conducive to the township government to implement continuous supervision and regulation;The high price of green household products will reduce the purchasing behavior of rural consumers.